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Reconsidering Contractual Consent
WHY WE SHOULDN’T WORRY TOO MUCH ABOUT
BOILERPLATE AND OTHER PUZZLES
Nathan B. Oman†
INTRODUCTION
Since modern contract doctrine took its current form at
the turn of the twentieth century, contract law has been haunted
by a persistent anxiety. A myriad of doctrines, from the law of
offer and acceptance to consideration to rules governing
interpretation, assume that contracts are voluntary agreements
mutually negotiated between promisors and promisees. Everyone
is assumed to understand that to which they agree and to
voluntarily undertake the obligations contained in the contract.
The anxiety comes from the fact that this vision of fully informed
and fully voluntary transactions so often departs from the reality
of contractual practice, where parties often agree to contracts
with only the haziest notion of what terms they include and
where formation is routinely beset with threats and pressures
that seem removed from the freely consenting parties envisioned
by the doctrine. The anxiety is nicely captured by one professor’s
summary of the standard 1L class on the subject:
Contracts. Study rules based on a model of two-fisted negotiators
with equal bargaining power who dicker freely, voluntarily agree on
all terms, and reduce their understanding to a writing intended to
embody their full agreement. Learn that the last contract fitting this
model was signed in 1879.1
© Nathan B. Oman, 2017. The author has not granted rights to reprint this
article under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial 4.0 License. Please contact
the author directly for reprint permission.
† Rita Ann Rollins Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. I
presented an earlier version of this essay at the New Private Law Seminar at Harvard
Law School, and would like to thank Henry Smith and John Goldberg for the invitation
and the seminar participants for their feedback and criticisms. As always, I thank Heather.
1 James D. Gordon III, Essay, How Not to Succeed in Law School, 100 YALE
L.J. 1679, 1696 (1991).
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At the center of this anxiety is the idea of voluntary consent and
the supposedly exalted position that we assume it ought to occupy
in any normative justification of contract law. The central thesis
of this essay is that this assumption is false. Individual voluntary
consent is far less important to the normative defense of contract
law than we have traditionally assumed.
Consent occupies a paradoxical position in contemporary
theories of contract law.2 The philosophy of contract law is
dominated by consequentialist theories that take the goal of
contract law to be economic efficiency, and various moral or
deontological theories that argue that contracts should be
enforced out of respect for the autonomous choice of contracting
parties. Both the economic theories and the autonomy theories
place substantial demands on the voluntariness of contractual
consent because voluntariness is key to their accounts of the
normative foundations of contractual liability.3 In a nutshell,
efficiency theorists defend contractual enforcement because the
fact that parties voluntarily made a contract is strong prima
facie evidence that enforcing it will increase welfare. In this
theory, voluntariness is a powerful epistemic marker, but only so
long as we assume that contractual choices are well-informed and
uncoerced. Autonomy theories, in contrast, see voluntariness as
important because it is the characteristic of contractual activity
that makes it worthy of respect. Contracts are to be enforced
because doing so respects the autonomy of the contracting party.
To not respect the deliberate commitments of those parties is to
infantilize them, to treat them as persons incapable of ordering
their own lives. Like the efficiency argument, however, this
approach makes sense only if choices are deliberate and
uncoerced. Again, the theory places substantial demands on the
voluntariness of transactions.
Despite the theoretical centrality of voluntariness to most
normative defenses of contract law, however, contract doctrine
places relatively few demands on contractual consent. Where
efficiency and autonomy theories demand that consent be well-
2 In the scholarly literature, the term “consent” is sometimes used to refer to
a particular account of contractual liability, one that denies that contracts are promises
that the law enforces and instead insists that contracts consist of the consensual
transfer of pre-existing rights. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986) (arguing that contract law is best thought of as a consensual
transfer of rights). This essay takes no position on that debate, and I do not believe
that anything in my argument hinges on characterizing a contract as a promise rather
than a consensual transfer of rights. Both theories demand that contractual obligations
be created by some voluntary action, and in this essay I shall treat the term “consent”
as meaning something like “voluntary action.”
3 In this essay, I shall use the terms “economic theory” and “efficiency
theory” interchangeably.
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informed and fully voluntary, contract doctrine is content to enforce
agreements where the parties are almost wholly ignorant of the
terms to which they agree and have been subject to substantial
pressure to consent. Consider boilerplate agreements, which
consist of preprinted forms drafted by attorneys and offered by
often-ignorant agents of a firm on a take-it-or-leave it basis. In this
context, parties are held to complex terms, often drafted by third
parties, that were not negotiated and may have been wholly
incomprehensible to both offeror and offeree. In such situations,
there is a disconnect between our theories of contractual consent
and the legal doctrine of contractual consent.
The paradox arises because our theoretical approaches to
contract law have dramatically overestimated the importance of
voluntary consent in the normative defense of contract law. In
contrast, I argue that contract law should be seen as part of an
evolutionary process of finding solutions to problems of social
organization in markets.4 Like natural evolution, this process
depends on variation and feedback. Unlike natural evolution,
both the variation and the feedback mechanisms are products
of human invention. On this theory, consent serves two roles in
contract law. First, consent makes freedom of contract possible
and freedom of contract generates variation in transactional
structures. In effect, it creates a store of possible solutions to
problems of social organization. Second, consent is one method
among several by which “bad” solutions are weeded out and
“good” solutions are selected. Consent, however, is not the only—
or in many cases even the primary—feedback mechanism for
transactional structures. Hence, in many situations we are
comfortable enforcing contracts where consent is formal at best
and the voluntariness of contracting parties is open to serious
doubt. This is because there are other mechanisms that mitigate
against pathological transactional forms. Ultimately “meaningful
consent” is not a necessary condition for the normative
justification of contractual enforcement. The advantage of this
evolutionary view of consent is that it places far fewer normative
demands on the idea of voluntariness and does a better job of
explaining and defending current contract doctrine.
4 Elsewhere, I have offered an extensive defense of the moral desirability of
well-functioning markets, a desirability that extends well beyond the efficient allocation
of resources. There is little point in restating my arguments in detail here. Suffice to say
that I believe that well-functioning markets are an integral part of a liberal political order
and have offered reasons for that belief at soporific length. See generally NATHAN B.
OMAN, THE DIGNITY OF COMMERCE: MARKETS AND THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONTRACT LAW (2016); Nathan B. Oman, Markets as a Moral Foundation for Contract
Law, 98 IOWAL. REV. 183 (2012).
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This essay proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the role of
consent in contemporary contract law theory, arguing that both
economic theories and autonomy theories of contract place
substantial demands on the voluntariness of consent. In Part II, I
propose an alternative normative account of contract law, one that
places the emphasis on variation and evolution and demands far
less of contractual consent. Finally, in Part III, I evaluate these
theories in light of the current doctrine surrounding boilerplate
agreements, arguing that consent is less important in the
justification of contractual enforcement than is often assumed.
I. CONSENT AND CONTRACT THEORY
Both economic and autonomy theories of contract law
place a premium on free and informed consent. For efficiency
theories, consent is a marker that allows legal decision
makers to know that the redistribution of resources resulting
from voluntary transactions increases welfare. For autonomy
theories, consensual agreements are worthy of legal enforcement
because they represent the considered choices of contracting
parties. By enforcing contracts, the law assists parties in their
own process of self-authorship. Crucially, however, this account of
contractual obligations requires that contracts in fact reflect the
free and considered judgments of the parties. If the consent is not
fully voluntary, it is difficult to see how contractual liability
represents a form of self-authorship.
A. Consent and Efficiency Theories of Contract
For economic theorists the normative goal of contract
law is to create incentives for contracting parties to behave in
efficient ways. Efficiency, in turn, is ultimately a matter of the
allocation of resources. Most law and economics theorists are
committed to the idea of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.5 Speaking very
roughly, every Kaldor-Hicks efficient reallocation of resources is
thought to increase aggregate social welfare and is normatively
desirable for that reason. Under the Kaldor-Hicks criteria, A is
efficient to B if those better off in A could fully compensate those
worse off in A, all while still preferring A to B. As a normative
criterion, efficiency has been the object of extensive criticism
and refinement.6 I have no desire to revisit those debates here.7
5 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7
(4th ed. 2011); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14–15 (5th ed. 1998).
6 For some of the most important criticisms see JULES COLEMAN, MARKETS,
MORALS, AND THE LAW 95–132 (1998); Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, in A
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Rather I want to examine the relationship between efficiency
and consent in economic theories of contract.
The concept of efficiency is indifferent as to the method
by which resources are allocated. Indeed, in the early twentieth
century, when faith in the power of economic planning was
running high, some economists argued that one could
centralize allocation of resources, with economic czars efficiently
distributing resources across society.8 Less ambitiously, law and
economics scholars have justified a host of doctrines that allow
the forced legal transfer of resources on the grounds of efficiency.
Hence, for example, the doctrine of negligence in effect allows
some parties to throw the costs of their conduct onto others
without those others’ consent so long as avoiding the costs is
prohibitively expensive in relation to the harm suffered.9
Indeed, the famous theory of efficient breach posits that
contract breachers ought to be free to substitute the payment of
damages for performance without a promisee’s consent. The
theory of efficient breach has been widely criticized on
economic grounds, but not because it contemplates the forced
transfer of some valuable entitlement without consent.10
Richard Craswell has gone so far as to argue that most of
contract doctrine deals with default rules, that is the resolution
of issues that the parties failed to resolve through mutual
agreement, and that efficiency analysis is therefore uniquely
well suited for specifying contract law precisely because it need
not rely on consent to justify rules.11
What then is the role of voluntary consent in economic
theories of contract law? Milton Friedman has provided the most
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 237–66 (1985). For some of the more ingenious refinements, see
generally LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002)
(arguing that across a broad domain of substantive areas lawmakers should focus
exclusively on maximizing welfare); EYAL ZAMIR & BARAK MEDINA, LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND MORALITY (2010) (arguing that across a wide domain of substantive areas the
pursuit of welfare should be limited by moral side constraints).
7 I have, however, revisited those debates at length elsewhere. See OMAN,
supra note 4 at 40–66.
8 See generally Allin Cottrell & W. Paul Cockshott, Calculation, Complexity
and Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Once Again, 5 REV. POL. ECON. 73
(1993) (discussing the so-called socialist calculation debate).
9 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 29 (1972).
10 See, e.g., William P. Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for
Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. ECON. 39, 47 (1984) (discussing the problem of efficient
reliance under expectation damages); Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of
Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 470–71 (1980) (same); Steven Shavell, The Design of
Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q. J. ECON. 121, 122 (1984) (same).
11 See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 507–29 (1989).
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plausible answer: “The possibility of co-ordination through
voluntary co-operation rests on the elementary—yet frequently
denied—proposition that both parties to an economic transaction
benefit from it, provided the transaction is bi-laterally voluntary
and informed.”12 The efficiency argument for the importance of
voluntary consent hinges on the superiority of the information
that contracting parties have about the effect of transactional
structures on their own welfare. Notice that even outside of the
context of mutual consent, some contract doctrines can be
justified in terms of the superior information and understanding
of contracting parties. For example, in the famous case of Hadley
v. Baxendale, a common carrier who failed to deliver a mill shaft
as promised was held not to be liable for lost-profits as a result
of the mill standing idle.13 The rule in Hadley, which limits
consequential damages for breach to those reasonably
foreseeable at the time the parties enter into the agreement, has
been justified as providing an incentive for parties to disclose
private information.14 The effect of the rule is to punish parties
that fail to disclose private information about idiosyncratic
potential losses in the event of breach. Notice that this argument
assumes that the party has privileged and superior access to
information about the welfare effects of the contract.
Voluntary consent thus acts as an epistemic marker,
vouchsafing to legal decision makers that transactions are
increasing welfare even when it is difficult and perhaps
impossible for judges or legislators to observe those increases
directly. The epistemic value of consent, however, drops
dramatically when consent is coerced or uninformed. Consider
the person who agrees to contract because of a threat. We can
assume that the party agreed because she is better off doing so
than suffering the threat. However, we cannot know that in the
absence of the threat that the transaction increases welfare.
Likewise, if I agree to a complex transaction that I do not
understand, the bare fact of my consent provides relatively little
information about the welfare effects of the contract. Thus, the
12 MILTONFRIEDMAN, CAPITALISMAND FREEDOM 13 (1962) (emphasis in original).
13 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
14 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 101 (1989). Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. argued that the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale should be understood as requiring
mutual consent to unforeseeable consequential damages, however, his approach has
generally been rejected. Under the Restatement, for example, liability turns on the
disclosure of information rather than agreement. Compare Globe Refining Co. v. Landa
Cotton Oil Co., 190 U.S. 540, 545 (1903) (Holmes J.) (holding that mere notice was
insufficient to impose liability for consequential damages) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 351 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[T]he party in breach need not have
made a ‘tacit agreement’ to be liable for the loss.”).
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efficiency argument places substantial demands on voluntary
consent. In order to fulfill its epistemic role in the efficiency
argument, consent must be informed and free of coercion.15
B. Consent and Autonomy Theories of Contract
Unlike economic accounts, autonomy arguments do not
justify contractual liability by its effect on welfare. Indeed,
autonomy theories are not ultimately concerned with distribution.
They do not look to the allocation of resources that results from
contractual activity for a justification of contract.16 Rather, they
look to the nature of contractual consent itself. While there is
considerable variation in how these theories spell out the
philosophical details of justifying contract law, they all begin
with the premise that parties to a contract are agents who
choose to impose obligations on themselves and the very fact
that these obligations are freely chosen is what makes them
worthy of legal enforcement.17
Charles Fried provided the canonical modern statement
of this position a generation ago, arguing that contractual
liability flows from a basically Kantian stance toward political
morality.18 Human beings, he argued, should be treated as
agents rather than objects. We must understand one another
as self-directed beings with our own values and plans. While
the state may not impose on us an overriding conception of the
good life, it should create laws that enhance human freedom.
Crucially, our ability as autonomous agents to pursue our
values and plans in the world is enhanced if we can enlist the
cooperation of others. The trick is to do this without treating
those other people as mere things, resources that can be
15 Additionally, voluntariness must be readily observable. Indeed, Friedman’s
argument rests on the assumption that it is difficult for decision makers to observe
increases in welfare but relatively easy for them to observe voluntary transactions.
However, it may be quite difficult to observe voluntariness. Indeed, for this reason,
Anthony Kronman proposed that welfare be used as a proxy for voluntariness. In other
words, because it is difficult to determine whether a transaction is truly voluntary,
decision makers should ask whether the transaction involves a mutual increase in the
parties’ welfare and label it as voluntary when this condition is met. Such an approach, of
course, inverts the epistemic assumption of the argument in the main text. See generally
Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALEL.J. 472 (1980).
16 To use Robert Nozick’s terminology, autonomy theories rest on a historical
rather than a patterned theory of justice. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND
UTOPIA 200–03 (2d ed. 2013).
17 See Peter Benson, Contract, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND
LEGAL THEORY 37–49 (Dennis Patterson ed., 2d ed. 1996) (summarizing autonomy
theories of contract).
18 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 17 (1981).
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consumed as we pursue our goals. We do this by enlisting their
participation voluntarily and by making voluntary commitments
of our own. When the state enforces a contract it is respecting
the jointly authored obligations of the contracting parties,
enhancing their freedom by providing a mechanism for
enlisting the assistance of others while simultaneously treating
those others as agents rather than objects.19
Note the role of voluntary consent in Fried’s theory and
the theories of those that share his basic orientation toward
contract law. For autonomy theories what is normatively
important about contractual liability is that contracts are chosen,
and contractual liability rests on respect for the autonomy of
contracting parties. Those with contractual capacity should be
treated as adults entitled to make their own decisions. The
refusal to enforce contracts freely chosen by the parties
infantilizes them, treating them not as agents but as wards of
society unable to choose their own vision of the good life and
implement their plans accordingly.
There is undoubtedly a libertarian flavor to autonomy
theories of contract, and certainly such theories provide ample
resources to criticize paternalist impulses in contract law.
Judges and legislators ought not to substitute their vision of
the good for that of the parties to a contract. Autonomy
theories, however, are also concerned with freedom from
contract.20 The self-authorship of contracting parties justifies
the imposition of contractual liability. However, when contracts
do not represent the choices of parties, autonomy theories
condemn the creation of contractual liability. Legal obligations
that result from coercion or simple ignorance do not represent
the autonomous choice of contracting parties. Rather, in these
cases the parties have been treated as mere objects, manipulated
by outside forces and outside parties. Justified contractual
liability must therefore be free of coercion and be sufficiently
informed so that we can be confident that the obligations
represent an act of self-authorship.
19 There are any number of criticisms that can be made to the details of Fried’s
theory of contract, particularly the strong link that he makes between contractual liability
and the moral obligations to keep a promise. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Some
Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1022 (1992) (arguing that the law
should not enforce personal moral obligations such as promissory moral obligations);
Seanna Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708
(2007) (arguing that promissory morality places a set of normative constraints on contract
law without necessarily being directly reflected in the law).
20 See, for example, the articles collected in the 2004 Wisconsin Law Review
symposium on “freedom from contract.” Omri Ben-Shahar, Foreword: Freedom from
Contract, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 261, 263 (summarizing the symposium).
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Much has been made in contemporary contract
scholarship of the conflict between economic and autonomy
theories of contract and the need to reconcile or choose between
them.21 On the issue of contractual consent, however, there is a
convergence between the two approaches. The presence of such
merely formal agreement does not vouchsafe to legal decision
makers the confidence either that resources are being
reallocated in efficient ways by the transaction or that the
choice of the parties represents an instance of autonomous
agents implementing their own freely chosen vision of the good
life. Rather, in order to do the normative work assigned to it by
both approaches, contractual consent must be both free of
coercion and sufficiently well-informed that we may confidently
draw inferences of welfare or self-authorship from it. To the
extent that consent is invoked to justify the enforcement of
contracts, mere formal agreement is insufficient.
II. RECONSIDERING CONTRACTUAL CONSENT
In this Part and the next, I seek to relocate the role of
consent in the justification of contract doctrine. In a nutshell,
contracts solve social problems by allowing for the decentralized
authorship of legal obligations. This process does not require
that all contracts meet the demanding requirements for consent
laid out by autonomy or efficiency theories of contract. Consent
need not sit at the center of the justification on contract law. If
we think of contract law as providing a kind of decentralized
law-writing process, its great virtue is its greater flexibility and
variation compared to ordinary legislation. This allows it to act
as an evolutionary mechanism for the solution of organizational
problems. Fully voluntary consent is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient element in the justification of contract in this
argument. Rather, consent serves two subordinate roles. First,
it coordinates the process of decentralized obligation authoring,
providing a kind of jurisdictional rule that manages potentially
conflicting legal duties. Second, it serves as one among many
feedback mechanisms that prevent the process of private
legislation from becoming abusive or destructive. Crucially,
neither of these roles require that the contractual consent be
particularly robust. Neither place heroic demands on how
21 See generally Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law: Groundwork
for the Reconciliation of Autonomy and Efficiency, 1 SOC. POL. & LEGAL PHIL. 385
(2002); Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and Efficiency in Contract Law: The
Vertical Integration Strategy, 11 PHIL. ISSUES 420 (2001); Nathan B. Oman, Unity and
Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1483 (2005).
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informed or “truly” voluntary consent need be. The merely formal
consent that is generally all that the law of contracts demands is
sufficient to fulfill both roles.
A. Evolution and Legal Obligations
We use contracts to solve problems of social organization.
Economists have tried to describe these problems in specific terms
such as ex post opportunism or the need to create incentives for
optimal, transaction-specific investments.22 Others have seen
contracts as means for institutionalizing lessons learned from the
iterative process of repeated interactions or even self-expression.23
Why do artisanal cheese makers organize themselves as
cooperatives rather than corporations or limited liability
companies? Because this particular contractual structure signals
something about their business and its separation from dominant
models of commoditized profit seeking.24 To the extent that there is
a problem to which legally enforceable obligations could be a
solution, contracts provide a possible tool for overcoming the
problem. It is important to see, however, that for most of these
problems, contract is by no means the only legal solution that we
might propose.
Henry Sumner Maine famously claimed that social
progress is marked by a transition from status to contract.25 By
status, he meant legal obligations that attach to particular social
roles, obligations that are authored by the community rather than
the individuals who happen to occupy those social roles.
Obligations associated with status may or may not be voluntary.
One may choose to take upon oneself certain statuses, such as wife
or husband, while other statuses, such as son or daughter, are not
chosen. Even when one voluntarily acquires a status, however, one
does not choose the particular obligations associated with that
status. Contract, in contrast, is marked by the freedom to author
the particular obligations that one undertakes. Rather than
choosing from a menu of prefabricated statuses, each set of
obligations becomes a bespoke creation of the obligor and the
obligee. Freedom of contract refers to this power to author
22 See generally Oliver E Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The
Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979) (discussing the
various economic theories of why parties use contracts).
23 See generally D. Gordon Smith & Brayden King, Contracts as
Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing uses of contracts other than those
traditionally discussed by economists).
24 I am grateful to Gordon Smith, an expert on all things related to cheese,
for this example.
25 See HENRY SUMNERMAINE, ANCIENT LAW 163–65 (4th ed. 1906).
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obligations. The greater the scope for individual authorship the
greater the freedom of contract.
For Maine, the transition from status to contract was
part of a progressive vision of history and civilization. The
barbarous tyranny of the past gradually gave way to the
enlightened freedom of the present. At the end of history lay
Victorian liberalism, with its emphasis on the autonomous
individual and his ability to impose on himself whatever
obligations he chose to impose.26 In nineteenth-century thought,
status and contract thus represented radically different modes of
legal organization centered on the opposing poles of collectivism
and individualism, tyranny, and freedom. For purposes of my
argument, however, the similarities between status and
contract are more interesting. Both can be equally serviceable
as solutions to problems of social coordination.
Think about the simple problem of ex post opportunism.
Quid is exchanged for pro over time, and the party who is paid up
front faces the temptation to take the money and run. One solution
to this problem would be to allow the parties to mutually author
the obligations that will govern their transaction. Presumably they
would agree to rules that would require the seller to deliver the
goods after being paid rather than absconding with the purchase
price. However, this problem could also be solved using a status
based rule. We could say that by accepting payment, a party
becomes “a vendor” and the law could then define the various
unamendable and non-disclaimable obligations associated with
that status. Provided that the duties imposed on a vendor by the
law included the obligation to convey goods paid for, a status based
rule solves the problem of ex post opportunism.
Ex post opportunism in the context of a one-shot sale of
goods is a relatively simple problem. Often, however, the
problems of coordination for which we might use contract as a
solution are more complex. Consider a business partnership.
Such a joint venture raises a myriad of problems. What will
each partner contribute? How will the gains of the venture be
allocated? How will the losses be shared out? How long will the
venture last? What if one party dies? May a partner sell his or
her interest in the business? Under what circumstances, if any,
may one partner dissolve the business? If it is dissolved early,
26 The gender of the person is not, of course accidental. Nor one, suspects, is
the race. Victorian liberalism was content with both a general subordination of women
and with imperial domination of uncivilized races, although in fairness there were
Victorian liberals who questioned some of these forms of domination. See generally
JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (Susan Moller Okin ed.,1997) (a
Victorian defense of equal rights for women).
226 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1
how are the assets and liabilities to be divided between the
parties? And so on. In the case of a simple sale, the basic
structure of the transaction is virtually self-evident. The duty of
the buyer is to pay for the goods. The duty of the seller is to
provide them.27 When it comes to more complicated interactions,
however, there is no a priori answer to the questions that arise.
Very different transactional structures are possible, and it is not
clear which of them is best.
We tend to assume that the problem of transactional design
is best solved by the application of knowledge and conscious
planning. To a certain extent this is always true. Complex
interactions of the kind regulated by status rules or contracts are
always human creations, conventions that are chosen or at least
articulated by individuals in terms of concepts that assume agency
and planning such as ends, means, norms, and the like.28 However,
it is important not to overestimate the importance of conscious
planning in the creation of effective transactional structures.
Sometimes, solutions may be discovered through sheer serendipity.
Writing in 1950, when faith in the power of economic planning was
running high across the developed world, Armen Alchian argued
that markets can display a process of unplanned evolution and
selection.29 Variations in firms and business models—regardless of
their original source—profit or go bankrupt in the market. Over
time, successful strategies emerge and are repeated. Articulating
his theory, Alchian wrote:
All individual rationality, motivation, and foresight will be
temporarily abandoned in order to concentrate upon the ability of
the environment to adopt “appropriate” survivors even in the
absence of any adaptive behavior. This is an apparently unrealistic,
but nevertheless very useful, expository approach in establishing the
attenuation between the ex post survival criterion and the role of the
individual’s adaptive decision criterion.30
27 This simplicity, of course, is only apparent. The law of sales is devoted to
the complexities that arise from the apparently self-evident structure of quid pro quo.
Is there a warranty? When is delivery due? Is payment a condition for delivery or vice
versa? Both? Neither? How should the risk of loss be allocated if there is some mishap
in the midst of delivery? And so. This point, however, only further reinforces the
argument above.
28 Indeed, at least one scholar has identified contract with the concept of plans.
See generally Curtis Bridgeman, Contracts as Plans, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 341 (2009).
29 See generally Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic
Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950).
30 Id. at 214 (emphasis in original); WILLIAM J. BERNSTEIN, A SPLENDID
EXCHANGE: HOW TRADE SHAPED THE WORLD 76 (2008) (“For several centuries after the
fall of Rome, the fragments of the old empire suffered in obscurity as backwaters of
world commerce.”).
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Even if we assume that there is no planning involved in the
creation of transactional structures but merely random chance,
he in effect argued, competition in the market will tend to
select for transactional structures that maximize the chances of
a firm’s survival.
Alchian’s model of completely unguided variation is
unrealistic because economic actors regularly plan and pursue
goals rather than acting randomly, but it is possible to observe
something like the process of transactional selection in history.
During the Middle Ages, the Islamic Middle East far outpaced
Europe in economic terms.31 During this period Arab commerce
was nominally governed by Islamic law, a body of rules
articulated by religious jurists based on the revealed text of the
Qur’an and the example of the Prophet.32 Commercial
relationships were overwhelmingly personal in nature. The kind
of massive impersonal transactions represented by something
like modern capital markets were unknown, and Islamic law
reflected this reality. Joint business ventures were governed by
the Islamic law of partnership, which provided that all
partnerships were at will and were automatically dissolved upon
the death of a partner.33 As a result, the more partners that were
involved in a venture the greater the risk that it would be
dissolved unexpectedly by the death or withdrawal of a partner.
Accordingly, Islamic partnerships tended to be modest affairs,
overwhelmingly consisting of only two partners and extending
for a very short period, such as a single trading voyage.34
Islamic law did provide for more durable legal structures with
a device known as a waqf.35 Roughly analogous to a trust, a
waqf allowed for a pool of assets to be kept together despite the
death of the initial settlor.36 However, strict requirements of
adherence to the terms of the original grant kept the waqf from
developing into an effective commercial instrument.37 Instead it
was used almost exclusively to fund mosques, schools, and
public works such as water fountains.38
31 See MARSHALL G. S. HODGSON, THE VENTURE OF ISLAM, VOLUME 1: THE
CLASSICAL AGE OF ISLAM 301–05 (1974) (discussing economic conditions during the
high caliphate).
32 See NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW 75–85 (1964) (setting
forth the classical theory of Islamic law).
33 See TIMUR KURAN, THE LONG DIVERGENCE: HOW ISLAMIC LAW HELD BACK
THE MIDDLE EAST 63–77 (2011) (discussing the economic limitations of Islamic
partnership law).
34 Id. at 64–66.
35 Id. at 282–83.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See id. at 110, 282–83 (discussing the commercial limitations of the waqf).
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In contrast, during the late Middle Ages, Europeans
began developing more durable business structures. Italian
merchants and bankers pioneered an entity known as a
compagnia, which allowed for partnerships for a fixed period of
time.39 Later, Dutch and English merchants created joint stock
companies.40 In time, the corporation, which was originally a
legal device granting legal personality to collectives such as
towns, religious orders, and universities, was combined with
the idea of joint stock companies. The result was a legal entity
that exposed investors to far less risk of unwanted dissolution
than an Islamic partnership, even when the business venture
pooled the resources of hundreds or even thousands of
individuals. Hence, from the seventeenth century onward,
Western European legal systems provided for commercial
enterprises devoted to ever larger and more complex projects.41
In contrast, Islamic law meant that Arab commercial ventures
necessarily remained the limited personal affairs that
characterized commerce during the Middle Ages.
Neither the Islamic law of partnerships and waqf nor
the Italian compagnia were contractual in the modern sense.
Indeed, at the time neither Islamic law nor the jus commune
that governed Italy had any body of rules that corresponded
perfectly to modern contract law. There was no set of general
legal principles empowering parties to author the full scope of
their transactional obligations. It would not be until the
sixteenth century that legal theorists began to formulate such
rules in earnest and it would not be until the nineteenth
century that such rules became fully embedded in functioning
legal systems.42 Rather, the waqf and the compagnia arose in
legal worlds where parties made agreements and those
agreements sometimes created legal duties, but where the lion’s
share of the obligations—structuring even complex business
arrangements—arose as a matter of status. Traders, vendors,
partners, heirs, and the like all occupied particular social roles to
39 See JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT
HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA 7–9 (2003) (discussing the rise of the compagnia).
40 See id. at 19–25 (discussing the rise of the Dutch East India Company and
other joint-stock companies).
41 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE
WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 150–58 (1973) (discussing the role of
successful legal institutions in the economic rise of England and other European states).
42 See generally WIM DECOCK, THEOLOGIANS AND CONTRACT LAW: THE MORAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE IUS COMMUNE (2013) (discussing the long and complicated
intellectual history that finally produced the idea of a general law of contracts); JAMES
GORDLEY, THEPHILOSOPHICALORIGINS OFMODERNCONTRACTDOCTRINE (1991) (same).
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which legal obligations attached and the power of individuals to
alter those obligations through choice or agreement was limited.
Alchian, however, teaches us that what structures
market organization can be less choice and agreement—”the
individual’s adaptive decision criteria”—than evolution, a
process that is ultimately driven by variation and feedback.43
We can think of the Mediterranean basin, the Near East, and
Western Europe as a single vast economic system. Within that
system, accidents of history and religion generated various
legal regimes and with them transactional structures. In the
Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East, the Islamic law of
partnerships and waqfs dominated. While in the Western
Mediterranean the more durable structures of the compagnia
and later the joint stock company dominated. Competitive
pressures then tended to select in favor of those structures
descended from the compagnia rather than those descended
from the waqf. By the nineteenth century, the benefits of
Western models of business organization had become apparent,
and the Islamic lands began to adopt these models.44 This is, of
course, a massively oversimplified account of economic history
and one that probably unjustifiably gives pride of place to legal
structures as drivers of development. For purposes of my
argument what is important is the interplay of variation and
feedback and the relatively unimportant role of individual
consent and deliberate design. Those who created the
compagnia did not intend anything like the rise of modern
capitalism, even though the structures they created ultimately
contributed to its creation. Rather that outcome was the
product of evolution.
Crucially, the evolutionary mechanism envisioned here
is not natural. It arises from competition within a market, and
the nature of that competition results from legal and economic
institutions that are the products of human convention and
intention. The quality of the outcomes will be a function of two
things. The first is the breadth of variation. In a world where
there is little variation, there can be little evolution. The
second is the nature of the feedback mechanisms. Over time,
the combination of variation and feedback will produce
transactional structures that are “winners” in light of the
feedback mechanisms and will eliminate “losers.” Consent and
43 Alchian, supra note 29, at 214.
44 See KURAN, supra note 33, at 279–300 (recounting the history of the
adoption of Western business law by the Islamic world in the nineteenth century).
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freedom of contract can be seen as efforts to drive evolution by
providing both variation and a feedback.
As noted above, freedom of contract refers to the ability
of parties to an agreement to author the scope of their
obligations. It can thus be seen as an example of a broader
phenomenon, namely the power to author legal obligations.45 In
this sense, freedom of contract is like a very limited version of
the power that a legislature has to author legal obligations.
This fact has been recognized for both good and ill. The social
contract tradition is built on this analogy, seeking to assimilate
legislative power to a primeval contract and thus legitimate it.
Alternatively, modern critics of contract doctrine have suggested
that in at least some contexts there is something deeply
undemocratic and troubling about the quasi-legislative power
given to the authors of contracts.46 By increasing the number of
entities with the power to author legal obligations we increase
variation. We saw this in the case of partnership forms in the
late Middle Ages, where the multiplicity of lawmakers in the
Mediterranean basin generated the competing forms of the
waqf and the compagnia. The American constitution provides
another example, where “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory.”47 The same could be said of the
legal pluralism of early European states, where royal courts
competed with local courts, merchant courts, and religious
tribunals.48 In all of these cases, the multiplication of authors of
45 Complications lurk here. Some have suggested that contractual duties mirror
the moral duties created by a promise. On this view, freedom of contract does not
empower private parties to author legal obligations. Rather, it indicates the scope of the
state’s willingness to mirror moral obligations with legal obligations. See Gregory Klass,
Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726
(2008) (analyzing whether or not contract law should be thought of as conferring powers
on mirroring moral obligations). While I am skeptical that contract law is best thought of
as enforcing moral obligations the way, for example, we might think that criminal
prohibitions on murder enforce the moral obligation not to unjustifiably kill someone, I
note that even if one subscribes to this view, freedom of contract can still fulfill in part the
roles assigned to it in the argument above. However, to the extent that moral duties
created by promising may be less extensive that those envisioned by contract law, e.g.,
because promissory morality has more demanding voluntariness requirements to create
moral obligations, they will be less effective at providing variation.
46 See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT,
VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 33–34 (2013). See generally W. David
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84
HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971) (arguing that judicial and legislative oversight of boilerplate
is necessary to preserve democracy).
47 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
48 See HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 225 (1983) (discussing legal pluralism in medieval
European law).
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legal obligations increased the variability of obligations that
were “tried out” in the world.
B. Consent and the Problem of Coordination
A multiplicity of persons with the power to author legal
obligations, however, creates the risk of legal incoherence.
What are we to do when two obligation authors issue
apparently inconsistent rules? At various points in history,
resolving this question has proven difficult and at times
violent.49 Not surprisingly legal systems with multiple sources
of law have developed meta rules to solve these problems. This
is what the various bodies of conflicts rules do, both in
international law and within the American federal system.
Strikingly, consent can also serve this role. Hence, in the
international system sovereigns can author rules that bind
other sovereigns only so long as that sovereign consents via
treaty.50 Likewise, in the American federal system, states may
bind other states only through interstate compacts to which the
other state consents.51
In the argument I am advancing, freedom of contract is
logically prior to consent. The value of freedom of contract is
that it decentralizes the process of designing legal obligations
thus generating variation. This variation is a collective
resource. It is difficult to know in advance what transactional
structure will work best and freedom of contract makes it easier
to experiment with lots of alternatives. Seen in these terms, the
advantage of systems of contract over systems of status has less to
do with dichotomies between freedom and tyranny or community
and individual than that between uniformity and variation.
49 Consider the Investiture Crisis of the twelfth century, which arose out of
the competing claims of royal and ecclesiastical sovereignty, or its more local
manifestation in the ultimately fatal conflict between King Henry II of England and
Thomas Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury. See id. at 268–69 (recounting the conflict
between Henry II and the archbishop of Canterbury).
50 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1986) (“International agreements create law for the
states parties thereto . . . .”). The existence of customary international law does not
negate this point, as such law cannot be unilaterally created by one state and imposed
on another. See id. at § 102(2) (“Customary international law results from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”).
51 Such compacts are subject to the further requirement that Congress
consent to the agreement. See U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 10, cl. 3. (“No State shall, without
the Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another
State . . . .”). In construing interstate compacts, the Supreme Court has held that
ordinary principles of contract law control. See, e.g., Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v.
Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 (2013) (“Interstate compacts are construed as
contracts under principles of contract law.” (citing Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124,
128 (1987)).
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Status as a mechanism for designing transactional structures
lacks the creative fecundity of freedom of contract.
On this view, the purpose of consent is not to justify
contractual obligations. Contractual obligations are justified
because they are a useful mechanism for solving problems of
social coordination, and the decentralized process of freedom of
contract is a social process for the discovery of such useful
mechanisms. Rather, the purpose of consent is to coordinate
obligations in a world where freedom of contract creates
millions of potential legislators. Our worry is that we will
create a welter of conflicting legal obligations and in the
resulting chaos too many knights will be dispatched to deal
with troublesome priests.52 Consent solves this problem. We all
have the power to author legal obligations, but our power is
sharply limited. We can only author obligations for those who
consent to them. Notice, that if our sole concern is to avoid
conflicting claims to legal authority between the multiple
authors of legal obligations there is no reason that the bare
formality of consent shouldn’t be sufficient. To avoid conflicts,
consent needn’t be well-informed or even particularly
voluntary. Once consent ceases to be the primary means of
justifying contractual liability, the conceptual demands placed
on it are lessened dramatically.
C. Consent and the Problem of Feedback
Coordination, however, is not the only problem that we
solve in contract law with consent. Anytime someone is
empowered to author legal obligations we should be worried
about abuse.53 One needn’t believe that all men are devils to
52 In his dispute with Thomas Becket over the conflict between royal and
ecclesiastical law, Henry II purportedly instigated his knights to kill the archbishop by
shouting in his cups, “Will no one rid me of this troublesome priest?” BECKET
(Paramount 1964). No contemporary source attests to the story, however. One of them
does suggest that Henry said to his knights, “What miserable drones and traitors have
I nourished and promoted in my household, who let their lord be treated with such
shameful contempt by a low-born clerk!” FRANK BARLOW, THOMAS BECKET 235
(Reprint ed. 1990). I am grateful to my colleague Tom McSweeny for this reference.
Tom, of course, knows the details not only of Becket’s life but also of the lives of the
contemporary priests who served as Becket’s biographers.
53 As the religious leader Joseph Smith, Jr. observed in a different context:
“We have learned by sad experience that it is the nature and disposition of almost all
men, as soon as they get a little authority, as they suppose, they will immediately
begin to exercise unrighteous dominion.” THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST AND THE
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF
LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 121:39 (1981) (reproducing a portion of an 1839 letter by Joseph
Smith, Jr.).
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acknowledge that they are not all angels.54 There is thus
always the temptation to use legal authority predatorily to
extract wealth or other benefits at the expense of others. There
is also the problem of simple stupidity. Some transactional
forms are a bad idea. Consent can mitigate against both
problems. We could solve the problem of conflicts between
privately authored legal obligations by adopting some rule
other than consent. For example, we might have a rule saying
that obligations authored by those whose surnames begin with
letters earlier in the alphabet should have control over
obligations authored by those whose surnames begin with later
letters. Such a rule would eliminate the possibility of conflict
by providing a clear legal hierarchy. The advantage of consent
to such a rule, however, is that consent can also provide a
feedback mechanism against stupid or abusive obligations.
Such obligations, we would hope, are less likely to be assented
to by contracting parties.
Consent as a feedback mechanism, as opposed to
consent as a coordination mechanism, however, is far more
demanding. The bare formality of consent sufficient to solve the
problem of coordination will probably not function very
effectively as a feedback mechanism for policing abuse or
stupidity. A person may be coerced into an abusive transaction,
and consent where voluntariness is impaired by desperation
opens up the possibility of abuse by the author of contractual
terms. This reality creates a dilemma. On one hand, we want to
encourage the decentralized process of obligation authoring created
by freedom of contract. Tightening up our standards of consent by
requiring that parties be well-informed and that the voluntariness
of acceptance be untainted by coercion or desperation would
increase the value of the feedback mechanisms but at the cost of
limiting the variation provided by freedom of contract. If we
enforce contracts marked only by formal consent, however, we
will need other feedback mechanisms to weed out abusive and
stupid transactional structures.
We can look to two kinds of feedback mechanisms. The
first are those that are exogenous to the law. The clearest
example would be contracting in a competitive market.55 In
such a market, ill-informed parties may mutually agree to
54 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (“If men were angels,
no government would be necessary.”).
55 When I say that as a feedback mechanism market competition is
exogenous to law, I do not mean to suggest that law is not deeply implicated in the
structure of the market. Rather, I am making only the more prosaic point that this is
not a feedback mechanism that relies on the structure of contract law doctrine.
234 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:1
poorly adapted transactional forms. This needn’t worry us too
much, however, if market pressures will tend to drive
individuals and firms that engage in such transactions into
bankruptcy. This process will tend to keep even merely formal
consent from multiplying poorly designed contracts.56 Other
examples of exogenous feedback mechanisms might be negative
reputational effects from authoring predatory contract terms,
and the informal social sanctions that can be brought to bear
against those seen as engaging in sharp practices.57 Clearly,
however, the effectiveness of such exogenous feedback
mechanisms is contingent on social circumstances and may be
the topic of fierce empirical debate.58
Second, there are feedback mechanisms that are
endogenous to the law. Rather than relying on background
social conditions, the law can identify abusive or otherwise
undesirable transactional structures. The law can then withhold
legal enforcement from these transactions and, in extreme cases,
the law may take affirmative steps to suppress them. Hence, an
agreement between firms to cartelize some market is both
56 I do not think that the bankruptcy of a corporation is of great normative
concern, as the only necessary result of such a bankruptcy is wiping out the old equity
of the firm and replacing it with new equity, generally the firm’s subordinated pre-
bankruptcy debt. Bankruptcy needn’t imply that a firm will be broken up as a going
concern resulting in layoffs and social disruption. When this does occur, it is generally
because the underlying business model on which the firm is based is not sustainable.
In that case, the firm ought to be broken up, as maintaining firms that are economic
failures is not in the long-term best interests of society or those who work for such
firms, who are likely to find themselves in a worse position after organizing their lives
around the expectation that the unsustainable will be sustained indefinitely. See
generally THOMAS H. JACKSON, LOGIC AND THE LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986). In
the case of personal bankruptcy, there are legitimate reasons for allowing individuals
to avoid the full consequences of their choices. These issues, however, are generally
best dealt with through the law of bankruptcy and remedies more generally, rather
than through the substantive law of contracts. But see Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in
the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and
Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 283, 283 (1995)
(arguing that freedom of contract should be limited because in a welfare state the bad
decisions of contracting parties may be externalized to others).
57 In some instances, this pressure can prove to be very substantial. For
example, in Puritan Massachusetts, ministers were relatively effective in policing what
they viewed as unscrupulous behavior by merchants through public shaming and
denunciation. The Puritan experience, however, also illustrates the limits of this kind
of feedback, as the power of ministers waned over the course of the 18th century. See
MARK VALERI, HEAVENLY MERCHANDIZE: HOW RELIGION SHAPED COMMERCE IN
PURITAN AMERICA 37–73 (2010) (recounting the role of Puritan ministers in policing
commercial norms).
58 Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 827–28 (2006) (arguing that
one-sided contracts should be common in competitive consumer markets because they
allow extra-legal adjustment of disputes between firms and empowered consumers)
with Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Some Realities of Online Contracting, 19 SUP. CT.
ECON. REV. 11, 11–13 (2011) (summarizing research showing that there are no
consumers reading the online contracts to which they consent).
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unenforceable and treated as a crime under federal antitrust
laws.59 Numerous doctrines in contract law serve to police
contracts for abusive or harmful terms, most obviously
unconscionability and contracts that are void for violating public
policy.60 Less obvious examples include the voidability of contracts
made by infants or the mentally incompetent.61 We can
understand such doctrines as resting on a presumption that the
status of one of the contracting parties in such transactions
creates a risk of abuse. For autonomy theorists such
restrictions on freedom of contract are presumptively troubling
because they seem to be exercises in paternalism. Hence, for
example, the efforts of some scholars to argue that
unconscionability, properly understood, is about policing the
voluntariness of consent rather than the substance of
contractual terms.62 Harsh terms are taken as evidence of some
imperfection of consent, and it is the imperfection of consent
that autonomy theory finds troubling. The evolutionary
argument presented here, however, suggests that this is
backward. The evolutionary theory is untroubled by accusations
of paternalism because contract law does not reflect some primal
commitment to individual autonomy. In principle, the evolutionary
theory has no objection to refusing enforcement to contracts
because their substance is deemed to be otherwise pernicious
even if contract formation is fully voluntary.
There are, however, reasons to be skeptical of such
endogenous feedback mechanisms. Unlike exogenous feedback
mechanisms, such as competitive markets and social norms,
using the law as a feedback mechanism requires that we limit
variation in transactional design. Rather than letting parties
author new structures and then seeing how those structures
fair, we simply cut off the ability of the parties to author them.
If the feedback provided by consent, markets, and social norms
is insufficient, it may be necessary to do so. When the law does
this, however, the variation and fecundity provided by freedom
of contract is limited. We thus lose out on the benefits of
serendipitous discovery afforded by that process. Furthermore,
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(contracts in restraint of trade unenforceable); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2012) (making
contracts in restraint of trade a felony).
60 Id. at § 178 (contracts void for reasons of public policy); id. at § 208
(contracts unenforceable when unconscionable).
61 Id. at § 14 (infants lack contractual capacity); id. at § 15 (lack of capacity
due to mental illness or defect).
62 See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s
New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485–89 (1967) (discussing “bargaining naughtiness”
and unconscionability).
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we may be skeptical that judges, legislators, and other
lawmakers fully understand the transactions that they
anathematize. There is a long history of law givers, ignorant of
commerce, responding to complexity with thoughtless moralism
and condemnation.63 These, however, are entirely contingent
and precautionary concerns. Their force will vary from policy
maker to policy maker and from transaction type to transaction
type. Notice, however, that absent from the list of concerns is
deviation from any supposed libertarian purity of contract.
Contract law on this theory is simply not directly concerned
with autonomous choice and personal liberty.64
III. CONSENT AND CONTRACTDOCTRINE: THE EXAMPLE OF
BOILERPLATE
A. Boilerplate and Contract Doctrine
Despite the centrality of consent in the normative
justification of contract in contemporary theories, contract
doctrine routinely enforces contracts where the consent is
considerably more attenuated than that apparently demanded
by our theories. The widespread willingness of courts to enforce
boilerplate agreements provides a ubiquitous example of this
disconnect between theory and doctrine. With the invention of
the printing press, pre-printed contracts have long been
common.65 As contracts became increasingly important with the
rise of commercial and industrial society, boilerplate
agreements—pre-printed contracts offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis—became increasingly common. As early as 1917,
63 The Emperor Diocletian, for example, thought that the widespread
inflation caused by the devaluation of the Roman coinage resulted from a simple
increase in greed and responded with the disastrous Edict on Prices, which punished
merchants for the inflation caused by the policies of the Roman state. Likewise, early
modern clergymen, schooled in the medieval debates over usury, had a difficult time
understanding the nature of commercial finance, wrongly conflating unobjectionable
commercial practices with sharp dealing and extortion. See generally JOHN THOMAS
NOONAN, THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OFUSURY (1957); VALERI, supra note 57.
64 In the argument presented here, contract law is not entirely indifferent to
concerns for personal liberty. Indeed, one reason that one might value the commerce
that contract law makes possible is that it may be liberty enhancing in various ways,
such as promoting peaceful cooperation in the face of moral, religious, and ethnic
pluralism, generating the wealth that allows for some modicum of personal
independence, or expanding the choice of goods and services available. However, the
argument does not assume that the bare ability to impose legal obligations on one’s self
is central to personal freedom.
65 See, e.g., John Rosselli, From Princely Service to the Open Market: Singers
of Italian Opera and Their Patrons, 1600–1850, 1 CAMBRIDGE OPERA J. 1, 27 n.95
(1989) (noting that eighteenth century opera singers used pre-printed contracts).
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Nathan Isaacs was writing about the standardizing of contracts.66
Over the course of the twentieth- and twenty-first century, the
use of boilerplate contracts—particularly in the consumer
context—has increased. If anything, the advent of the computer
and the Internet has decreased the costs of contracting, making
boilerplate contracts even more ubiquitous.
Despite a torrent of academic criticism of boilerplate
agreements,67 however, courts generally enforced them as
written.68 Those who agree to contracts have a “duty to read”
what they sign, and judges are generally unsympathetic to
those who try to escape contractual obligations that they failed
to read.69 The fact that the contract was long or complicated is
generally not a defense.70 Likewise, courts have enforced
boilerplate agreements even where the act of consent was
fleeting at best, such as terms printed on the back of an already
purchased cruise ticket, which were “accepted” when the ticket
was used.71 In a few cases, courts have refused to enforce
boilerplate agreements that were purportedly accepted because
a consumer accessed a website that unobtrusively linked to the
boilerplate.72 However, if the boilerplate language appears on
66 See generally Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 YALE L.J.
34 (1917) (discussing contracts of adhesion in relationship to arguments over status
and contract).
67 See generally RADIN, supra note 46; Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629–42
(1943); Slawson, supra note 46, at 529.
68 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 287 (4th ed. 2004) (“A party that
signs an agreement is regarded as manifesting assent to it and may not later complain
about not having read or understood it, even if the agreement is on the other party’s
standard form.”).
69 See, e.g., Mitchell Nissan, Inc. v. Foster, 775 So.2d 138 (Ala. 2000) (holding
a party to a contract despite “limited reading ability”); Merit Music Serv., Inc. v.
Sonneborn, 225 A.2d 470, 476 (Md. 1967) (holding a party to a contract that was signed
but not read); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Schroeder, 84 N.W. 14 (Wis. 1900) (holding a party
to a contract even when he had limited ability to read English, which was not his
native language).
70 See, e.g., Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1291
(7th Cir. 1989).
71 See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 596 (1991) (enforcing a
forum selection clause printed on the back of a cruise line ticket). I once took a cruise
from Florida through the Caribbean. Several weeks after my ticket was purchased, I
arrived in Florida to board the ship. At the quay-side, the cruise representatives
presented me with a form contract containing an arbitration agreement and various
limitations on the cruise line’s liability. Much to the consternation of my children, I
paused to read the contract. I asked the employee presenting the contract if anyone
had ever refused to sign the agreement. He said that in the years that he had worked
for the cruise line he had only heard of one case where the ticket holder had not signed
and thus been denied entry to the ship. The employee didn’t know whether or not the
ticket holder had been granted a refund. To the relief of my children, I signed the
contract and boarded the ship.
72 See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014).
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screen and consumers are required to click “I agree,” courts
have uniformly found that a contract was formed.73
To be sure, courts do from time-to-time hold that the
enforcement of pre-printed contracts offered on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis is unconscionable.74 Indeed, the most iconic modern
unconscionability case involved boilerplate agreements.75 But
such cases are not the norm, and courts routinely enforce
boilerplate contracts against consumers even when they contain
terms that commentators regard as harsh.76 Section 211 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, building on a suggestion first
authored by Karl Llewellyn, states: “Where the other party has
reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would
not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular
term, the term is not part of the agreement.”77 However, the so-
called “reasonable expectations doctrine” has not been widely
73 See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 632–34 (8th Cir. 2005);
Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 529–30 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999); see also Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2006) (noting
that every court to consider the question as of 2006 has held that clickwrap agreements
are enforceable).
74 See, e.g., Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 344 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007) (finding an arbitration agreement unconscionable even in situations where the
consumer admitted to being aware of the clause in the boilerplate and having other
alternatives). In recent years, courts have been most eager to invoke unconscionability
in the context of consumer arbitration agreements, which may reflect judicial unease
with arbitration as much as with boilerplate agreements per se. See generally David
Horton, Unconsionability Wars, 106 NW. L. REV. 387 (2012) (discussing the debates
over the application of unconscionability to doctrine arbitration contracts).
75 SeeWilliams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (refusing to enforce a cross collateralization agreement entered into by an
unsophisticated consumer).
76 See Glob. Travel Mktg. v. Shea, 908 So.2d 392, 405 (Fla. 2005) (enforcing
an arbitration agreement that denied parents access to court after a hyena killed their
child). See RADIN, supra note 46, at xiii–xiv (criticizing the case).
77 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The
Restatement (Second) in this section is influenced by a proposal made by Karl
Llwelleyn in his book, The Common Law Tradition. Llewellyn wrote:
The answer, I suggest, is this: Instead of thinking about “assent” to boiler-
plate clauses, we can recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no
assent at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few
dickered terms, and the broad type of the transactions, and but one thing
more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (no specific assent) to any not
unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not
alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms. The fine
print which has not been read has no business to cut under the reasonable
meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the dominant and the only
real expression of agreement, but much of it commonly belongs in.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).
Accord Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, Prausnitz: The Standardization of Commercial
Contracts in English and Cont’l Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 700 (1939); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 rep. note (citing LLEWELLYN, supra;
Llwelleyn, supra).
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followed beyond the context of insurance contracting.78 In short,
the enforcement of boilerplate agreements is very much the
rule in American contract law rather than the exception.
B. Boilerplate and Traditional Theories of Consent
There are two main lines of criticism against boilerplate
agreements. The first is that those that sign such contracts
seldom read them and, were they to do so, it would often be
impossible for a layperson to understand the technical language
in which they are written. Indeed, the puckish lawyers who draft
such agreements often insert odd-ball terms with the sure
knowledge that they will not be read. Hence, the form contract to
which all users of Amazon Web Services must agree states that
the restriction on using its software for “life-critical or safety-
critical systems, such as use in operation of medical equipment,
automated transportation systems, autonomous vehicles, aircraft
or air traffic control, nuclear facilities, manned spacecraft, or
military use in connection with live combat”79 is limited.
[T]his restriction will not apply in the event of the occurrence
(certified by the United States Centers for Disease Control or
successor body) of a widespread viral infection transmitted via bites
or contact with bodily fluids that causes human corpses to reanimate
and seek to consume living human flesh, blood, brain or nerve tissue
and is likely to result in the fall of organized civilization.80
Amazon, it would seem, is fine with your using its services to
launch a spaceship to escape from the zombie apocalypse or
perhaps set off a nuclear device against flesh-eating monsters.
Apple, on the other hand, is not so generous, insisting in the
boilerplate associated with the iTunes software that “[y]ou also
agree that you will not use the Apple Software for . . . the
development, design, manufacture or production of missiles, or
nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.”81 Another software
company threatened that “a leather-winged demon of the night
will tear itself, shrieking blood and fury, from the endless
78 Compare C&J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176
(Iowa 1975) (invalidating a condition in an insurance contract under the reasonable
expectations doctrine) with Coup v. Scottsdale Plaza Resort, LLC., 823 F. Supp. 2d 931,
947 (D. Ariz., 2011) (declining to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine to an
arbitration agreement).
79 AWS Service Terms, AMAZON WEB SERVICES § 57.10, http://aws.amazon.com/
service-terms/ [https://perma.cc/G348-GC8V].
80 Id.
81 APPLE, INC., SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR ITUNES § 9, http://
images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iTunes.pdf [https://perma.cc/KTK6-A6HS].
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caverns of the nether world[ ] [and] hurl itself”82 against those
breaching the terms of the company’s end-user license
agreement.83 On a more serious note, careful research by
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and others on the browsing
behavior of those who agree to online boilerplate confirms that
essentially no one is reading the fine print.84
The second line of criticism is that even if consumers did
read the terms of the boilerplate agreements that they sign,
their consent to such agreements isn’t meaningful. Writing in
the 1940s, Friedrich Kessler insisted:
Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises with strong
bargaining power. The weaker party, in need of the goods or services,
is frequently not in a position to shop around for better terms, either
because the author of the standard contract has a monopoly (natural
or artificial) or because all competitors use the same clauses. His
contractual intention is but a subjection more or less voluntary to
terms dictated by the stronger party, terms whose consequences are
often understood only in a vague way, if all.85
Such contracts, he insisted, help to create “industrial empires”86
and are tools in the hands of “commercial overlords enabling
them to impose a new feudal order of their ownmaking upon a vast
host of vassals.”87 Modern scholars continue to use the language of
inequalities of bargaining power but have supplemented it with
arguments drawn from behavioral economics, suggesting that
consumers are manipulated by savvy and powerful corporations
into bargaining away their rights.88
The most forceful recent critic of boilerplate agreements
is Margaret Radin. She objects to the enforcement of such
agreements on both autonomy and efficiency grounds. She sees
in boilerplate agreements a process by which autonomous
82 Lemley, supra note 73, at 470 n.36 (quoting Alchemy Mindworks, MINDWORKSHOP,
http://www.mindworkshop.com/alchemy6.html [https://perma.cc/ZF9Y-WVQU]).
83 For a summary of computer contracting and the law it is produced, see
NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS (2013).
84 See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2014); Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 58, at 11; Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An Empirical Analysis of Software
License Agreements, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 677, 677 (2007).
85 Kessler, supra note 67, at 632.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 640.
88 See generally OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS,
AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); RADIN, supra note 46; Russell
Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and Contract Law, in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 116 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Russell Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1203, 1203–04 (2003).
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choice decays to a point of normative irrelevance. Specifically,
she asserts: “Agreement gets reduced to consent, then further
reduced to assent. Next assent becomes ‘blanket assent’ to
unknown terms, provided they are what a consumer—an
abstract general construct of a ‘consumer’—might have
expected.”89 She concludes that even this vision of nominal assent
to “expected” terms disintegrates because it rests on the false
premise that firms and consumers have the same social
understandings. The search for “objective” assent is thus a fiction
that amounts to allowing firms to profit at the expense of feckless
consumers or requires, contra current doctrine, the conclusion
that consumers haven’t meaningfully consented to boilerplate
terms.90 Accordingly, she insists that efforts to justify the
enforcement of boilerplate in terms of personal freedom fail.
“They remain at odds with the underlying commitment to a realm
of private ordering instantiating the individual freedom that,
according to traditional liberal theory, justifies the state’s
existence. Boilerplate alternative legal universes simply do not
assimilate to freedom of contract. They lead us instead to
normative and democratic degradation.”91
Radin is similarly skeptical of claims that enforcing
boilerplate agreements is economically efficient. Here, her
arguments rest again on imperfections of contractual consent.
Rather than attacking consent to boilerplate agreements as
failing to reflect an individual act of private ordering, she
argues in effect that consent to boilerplate fails to satisfy
Friedman’s requirement that it be “bi-laterally voluntary and
informed.”92 First she notes the pervasive asymmetry of
information between firms and the consumers who consent to
boilerplate.93 This creates the well-known problem of a “lemons
equilibrium” in which pervasive discounting destroys value.94
She also invokes behavioral psychology, noting the pervasive
use of heuristics and other cognitive biases that prevent
consumers from accurately assessing risks even when they
have adequate information.95 As a result, she argues, we simply
89 RADIN, supra note 46, at 82.
90 See id. at 86–92.
91 See id. at 97–98.
92 FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 13.
93 See RADIN, supra note 46, at 103.
94 See id. at 106–08.; George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970) (explaining
how asymmetric information leads to inefficient pricing).
95 RADIN, supra note 46, at 102 (discussing “pervasive heuristic biases”)
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cannot confidently draw meaningful conclusions about welfare
from the bare fact of consent to boilerplate.96
Since Kessler’s initial attacks in the 1940s, the most
vociferous critics of boilerplate agreements have insisted that
the enforcement of such contracts threatens democracy and the
rule of law itself.97 Initially such claims seem hyperbolic if not
hysterical. (Most people do not experience the iTunes end user
license agreement as an instance of lawless tyranny.) However,
this critique has more substance than one might assume. If we
concede that the consent to boilerplate isn’t meaningful on
either autonomy or efficiency grounds, we are left with the
stark conclusion that the law of contracts grants to firms the
power to unilaterally author legal obligations. This looks like a
legislative function. In a democracy, the process of legislation
must be accountable to voters through elections and elected
legislatures. Boilerplate, however, dispenses with the
democratic forms. Firms thus wield a kind of legislative power
without democratic legitimacy. They then use this power to
avoid their obligations under democratically legitimate bodies
such as tort and consumer protection statutes through arbitration
agreements, burdensome forum selection clauses, and the like that
render such democratic lawmaking a dead letter. In this dystopian
and apocalyptic vision, by enforcing contracts without robust
consent, courts erode both democracy and the rule of law.
C. Boilerplate and Consent Reconsidered
Reformulating the role of consent in contract law in the
way suggested in Part II, however, blunts many of the criticisms
of the enforcement of boilerplate agreements, shifting our
attention away from the individual act of consent and toward the
broader social context in which parties agree to boilerplate and
courts enforce it. If voluntary consent no longer serves a primary
justificatory role in contract enforcement, then the apparently
fruitless search for autonomous self-authorship in the consent
to boilerplate agreements needn’t worry us greatly. The formal
consent required of boilerplate terms is sufficient to solve
problems of coordination. In many instances, individual
consent standing alone is insufficient as a feedback
mechanism, but provided that boilerplate is enforced in a social
context with other feedback mechanisms this fact need not
96 Id. (“These two problems—heuristic bias and information asymmetry—
render erroneous the assumption of economic rationality.”).
97 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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concern us greatly. We should quit worrying about consent to
boilerplate, and learn to be happy with its enforcement, at least
in the lion’s share of cases.
First, consider the problem of coordination. Lon Fuller
long ago noted the way that contractual formalities serve a
variety of useful functions in contract formation, clearly marking
the creation of legal obligations.98 The proliferation of formal
rituals around the creation of contracts—from the sacrificing of a
goat to the complex ritual of scales, bronze, and dirt required
under Roman law for the sale of certain kinds of land99—testifies
to the truth of Fuller’s insight. The formality of signing a written
document clearly understood to be a contract is the core case of
such a formality in our society.100 Hence, unlike cases where
determining the presence of any consent is difficult, boilerplate
contracts virtually always involve formal agreement.101
The formation of contracts on the internet has
challenged this situation, but the law seems to have retained
the requirement of formal consent. In Nguyen v. Barnes &
Noble, Inc., for example, the defendant tried to enforce the
“Terms of Use” on its website.102 The purported agreement was
contained in a file linked to at the bottom of each page of the
Barnes & Noble website. The defendant claimed that Nguyen
was bound by the Terms of Use because they declared, “By
visiting any area in the Barnes & Noble.com Site . . . a User is
deemed to have accepted the Terms of Use.”103 The court was
unpersuaded.104 Firms cannot bootstrap consent by placing
terms in the vicinity of consumers and then declaring that the
consumer has accepted the terms through sheer proximity.
Thus, courts have generally been unwilling to enforce such
98 See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–01
(1941) (setting forth the various uses of formality in contract formation).
99 Gaius, Institutes, I.119.
100 After more than a decade teaching contract law, I can testify that the one rule
of contract law that all 1L students arrive at law school knowing is that if you sign on the
dotted line you are bound by the terms of the agreement. The irony, of course, is that
because of the doctrine of consideration the one rule that everyone knows is wrong. Except,
in Pennsylvania, the one state where the UniformWritten Obligations Act remains in force.
See 33 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6 (2016) (“A written release or promise, hereafter made and signed
by the person releasing or promising, shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of
consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express statement, in any form of
language, that the signer intends to be legally bound.”).
101 Compare U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON
UNIFORM ST. LAWS 2014) (“An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may
be found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.”) with Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture, Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (refusing to enforce a
contract of adhesion that had been clearly signed by the consumer).
102 Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc.,763 F.3d 1171, 1174 (9th Cir. 2014).
103 Id. (quoting Barnes & Noble’s Terms of Use).
104 Id. at 1180.
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“browsewrap” agreements unless the consumer has actual
notice of the existence of the terms.105 In these cases even the
formality of consent may become attenuated. However,
increasingly, the standard practice in internet contracting has
been to use “clickwrap,” in which terms appear on screen and
users are required to click “I agree” before continuing. Such
agreements clearly have the formal consent necessary to solve
problems of coordination.
The mere formality of consent, however, is not enough
to lay to rest our concerns about the enforcement of boilerplate.
We must also assure ourselves that there are adequate
feedback mechanisms to weed out pernicious or otherwise
poorly adapted agreements. Consider what critics of boilerplate
often take as the most damning characterization of these
transactions. On this view, espoused by scholars such as Kessler,
Slawson, and Radin, boilerplate contracts represent the exercise
of legislative authority by private firms.106 How do we insure that
the product of legislation isn’t wantonly destructive? One
approach would be for legislators to read, understand, and
deliberate on each bill. However, we know that this is not the
case.107 Members of Congress seldom read bills or even the
committee reports that accompany them. Rather, we look to the
social context in which legislation is produced to police its content.
Periodic elections provide feedback on a macro scale. On a micro
105 Compare Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 38 (2d Cir.
2002) (refusing to enforce a browsewrap contract), and Be In, Inc. v. Google Inc., Case
No.: 12-CV-03373-LHK, 2013 WL 5568706, at *9 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (refusing to enforce a
browsewrap contract), and In re Zappos.com Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
893 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1064–65 (D. Nev. 2012) (refusing to enforce a browsewrap
arbitration agreement), and Van Tassell v. United Mktg. Grp., LLC, 795 F. Supp. 2d
770, 789, 793 (N.D.Ill. 2011) (refusing to compel arbitration when plaintiff “dispute[d]
that she ever saw the Conditions of Use when making purchases”), with Register.com,
Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that browsewrap contracts
may be enforced when the defendant is aware of the terms), and Sw. Airlines Co. v.
BoardFirst, LLC, Civil Action No. 3: 06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761, at *7 (N.D. Tex.
2007) (enforcing a browsewrap contract after a cease-and-desist letter from the plaintiff
informed the defendant of the existence of the contract), and Ticketmaster Corp. v.
Tickets.com, Inc., No. CV997654HLHVBKX, 2003 WL 21406289, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 2003);
see also Lemley, supra note 73, at 472–77 (discussing cases where courts have enforced
browsewrap agreements).
106 See RADIN, supra note 46, at 33–34 (discussing form contracts and
“democratic degradation”); Kessler, supra note 67, at 640 (“Freedom of contract enables
enterprisers to legislate by contract and, what is even more important, to legislate in a
substantially authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian
forms.”); Slawson, supra note 46, at 530 (“If by making law we mean imposing officially
enforceable duties or creating or restricting officially enforceable rights, then
automobile manufacturers make more warranty law in a day than most legislatures or
courts make in a year.”).
107 See Hanah Metchis Volokh, A Read-the-Bill Rule for Congress, 76 MO. L.
REV. 136, 136 (2011) (documenting the routine failure of members of Congress to read
the bills on which they vote).
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level, the constant scrutiny of the press and of lobbyists and
pressure groups constrains legislators. To be sure, this process
is highly imperfect.108 Crucially, however, we do not rely solely
on either the informed wisdom of legislators or their merely
formal consent to legislation to produce our laws. Rather, we
look to—and frequently debate and seek to restructure—the
social context in which those laws are produced.
Similar arguments can be made for boilerplate
agreements. First, while not all consumers read such contracts,
there are a few marginal shoppers that do. Firms, unable to
differentiate between consumers that read the fine print and
those that do not, are forced to compete for the marginal
shoppers by offering favorable terms.109 Empirical research on
end user license agreements suggests that in at least some
markets there are essentially no shoppers reading the
boilerplate agreement.110 This does not mean, however, as some
scholars have suggested, that the marginal shopper is a
myth.111 Credit cards, for example, provide an example where
issuers seem to be competing for customers with contract
terms. There are websites that amalgamate information on
interest rates, fees, and penalties. Furthermore, some card
holders discover that they are the beneficiaries of reward
programs embedded in boilerplate that they did not read.112
108 These pathologies have been explored with great ingenuity by public choice
theorists and others. See generally JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OFCONSENT (1999); MANCUROLSON, THELOGICOFCOLLECTIVEACTION (1971).
109 See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, RECONSTRUCTING CONTRACTS 124–30 (2013)
(discussing contract terms as a product attribute that will be policed by market
competition); George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J.
1297, 1307–13 (1981) (arguing that in a competitive market warranty terms will reflect
an efficient allocation of risk based on the relative costs of producers and consumers).
110 See Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, & Trossen, supra note 84 (documenting the
rarity of consumers who read boilerplate agreements on the internet).
111 See Eyal Zamir & Yuval Farkash, Standard Form Contracts: Empirical
Studies, Normative Implications, and the Fragmentation of Legal Scholarship, JERUSALEM
REV. LEGAL STUD. 15 (forthcoming), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=2546863 [https://perma.cc/JX5K-WHVN] (arguing that the marginal shopper theory has
been decisively disproven).
112 For example, I recently discovered that my American Express card gives
me the right to one free checked bag on Delta Airlines. First Checked Bag Free,
AMERICAN EXPRESS, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/credit-cards/benefits/detail/
first-checked-bag-free/delta-gold [https://perma.cc/X262-QFQB ]. Professor Marcus Cole
has reported the story of getting in an accident with a rental car, only to discover that
his Diner’s Club Card provided him with insurance that covered the cost of the accident
and an additional rental car at no additional charge. See Marcus Cole, Rational
Consumer Ignorance: When and Why Consumers Should Agree to Form Contracts
Without Even Reading Them, 11 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y 413, 417 (2015) (recounting the
story). Neither Professor Cole nor myself shopped for such terms, but the card
companies nevertheless believed that offering them would attract some customers.
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Even if, as seems to clearly be the case, that there are
some markets in which no one reads the fine print, it does not
follow that firms are benefiting at the expense of consumers.
Suppose a firm can snooker consumers by placing harsh or one-
sided terms in a contract. Presumably, this allows the firm to
decrease its costs. However, if the firm operates in a
competitive market, it will not be able to keep these decreased
costs in the form of profits. Rather, competition with other
firms will cause any rents to be dissipated in the form of lower
prices. Notice that this argument does not rest on any heroic
assumptions about the knowledge or rationality of consumers.
Rather, it assumes only that price is relatively easy to know
and that consumers react to prices. The transformation of
rights into cash raises concerns, but they are not necessarily
concerns that center around the notion of consent.
To take a common example, boilerplate contracts may
contain terms that limit consumers’ ability to pursue tort
litigation against firms in the event of an accident. This lowers
the firms’ costs, but in a competitive market those cost savings
will be passed back to consumers in the form of lower prices.
This does two things. First, it transforms legal rights into some
cash equivalent. Second, it will have a distributive effect
between consumers, making those who suffer no accidents
better off while making those that suffer accidents worse off.113
We may have good reasons for believing that certain kinds of
rights ought not to be treated as being fungible with cash.114 It
is important to see, however, that there is nothing distinct
about boilerplate or the quality of consent and these concerns.
Precisely the same issues would exist if consumers were
113 In a world in which consumers retain their tort rights, firms will charge
higher prices. Those consumers that suffer an accident will be better off because they
will have the benefit of pursuing a tort action against firm; however, those that suffer
no accidents will simply pay higher costs. If the firm can get consumers to disclaim
those rights, then prices will drop. Those that suffer no accidents will be better off,
while those that suffer an accident and now cannot pursue their tort action will be
worse off. Hence, the distributive effect of the boilerplate in a relatively competitive
market is between consumers rather than between firms and consumers.
114 Although, it is far from clear that tort rights are in this class. After all, the
tort system itself transforms those rights into cash, as does the ubiquitous practice of
tort settlements. For a skeptical view of the idea that all rights can be reduced to some
monetary equivalent, see ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
193–94 (1993). For a view of tort law that places emphasis on the process of litigation
itself in addition to the payout in damages, see Benjamin Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not
Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L. J. 695, 735 (2003) (“To afford a right of action to the
victim of a tort is to recognize that the victim has a right of response to what the
defendant did. In this respect, a right of action in tort, focused on the right to respond
to a legal wronging in the past, may be compared to self-defense in the criminal law,
which recognizes the right to preempt an anticipated wrongdoing by another.”).
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exhaustively informed about the nature of the boilerplate to
which they consent.115
Finally, firms face reputational constraints. Even if
consumers are unaware of the specific content of the fine print,
they may be broadly aware of the reputation of firms for
treating consumers well or badly. Indeed, firms routinely fail to
insist on the full scope of their contractual rights. This may be
because firms are better able to identify opportunistic consumers
than courts—a plausible assumption given the superior
information of firms—and wish to be able to weed out opportunistic
claims by insisting on contract terms while responding helpfully to
legitimate claims.116 For example, Amazon’s warranty obligations
for its Kindle e-Readers are limited by the terms of its
boilerplate agreements.117 However, I have obtained no less
than three free replacement Kindles—on one occasion involving
overnight international shipping—that were outside of
warranty. This behavior is consistent with research going back
decades suggesting that formal legal rights do no fully specify
the terms of actual business relationships.118 For example, an
early study of the use of warranties in the automobile industry
conducted in the wake of the famous case of Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,119 where the New Jersey Supreme
Court held the disclaimer of automobile warranties in a
boilerplate agreement unconscionable, found that generally
automobile companies stood behind their products regardless of
the formal terms in order to safeguard their reputations.120
Certainly, the vast investments that firms make in advertising
and trademarks suggests that they are often very sensitive to
115 The process of price competition coupled with ignorant consumers, however,
may create economic inefficiencies if consumers mistakenly value the rights that they give
up more than the savings that firms can reap and pass along in the form of lower prices.
This might happen, for example, if consumers suffer from systematic cognitive biases that
cause them to undervalue certain kinds of legal rights. In such a market, firms will be forced
by competition to offer lower prices with fewer legal rights even though this results in a loss
to all consumers. BAR-GILL, supra note 88, at 23–31. There are two things to note about this
argument. First, it does not involve firms profiting at the expense of consumers. Rather, it is
an argument that boilerplate simply creates a deadweight loss. Second, if this is in fact
happening, then firms are presented with an opportunity. They should be able to educate
consumers as to the real value of their legal rights, charging a higher price and splitting the
resulting surplus with consumers.
116 See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 58, at 835.
117 One-Year Limited Warranty for Amazon Devices, AMAZON, https://
www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201014520 [https://perma.cc/
Z5WY-7T7H].
118 The seminal study in this area is Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
119 Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
120 See William C. Whitford, Strict Products Liability and the Automobile
Industry: Much Ado About Nothing, 1968 WIS. L. REV. 83, 89–92 (1968).
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their reputations among consumers.121 In such cases, the
boilerplate terms can plausibly be seen as giving to firms
discretion to deal unfavorably with opportunistic consumers
who cannot be readily identified as such by courts.122
The feedback mechanisms provided by marginal
shoppers, price competition, and reputation may prove
insufficient for some classes of contracts. We might then turn
to the kind of endogenous legal feedback discussed above. For
example, under Israeli law, certain contract terms are
categorically banned.123 A similar approach has been taken at
times by state and federal regulators in the United States. For
theories of contract that place voluntary consent at the center
of its normative justification, such restrictions raise the specter
of paternalism. The approach to consent set forth in this essay,
however, has no such libertarian scruples. It thus offers no
objection in principle to such legislation, which may step in to
provide feedback when consent fails to do so. However, seeing
contract in evolutionary terms provides a separate set of
reasons to be skeptical of such an approach.
Recall, that the virtue of freedom of contract lies in the
variation it provides. It is this transactional fecundity, rather
than the autonomous choice of any particular party or mutual
utility narrowly conceived that justifies enforcing contracts. The
danger is that judges and lawmakers, unfamiliar with the
particular commercial contexts in which boilerplate is written will
simply lack the information or imagination to correctly identify
pernicious terms, seeing sharp dealing where something more
complicated may be happening. Beyond such cautionary
nostrums, however, the theory offered in this essay does not
provide any a priori reason for refusing to override the
voluntary consent of the parties when doing so is necessary to
create an environment with effective feedback mechanisms for
the authors of contractual obligations.
121 Critics of boilerplate will sometimes also make crude arguments about the
ability of firms with monopoly power to impose terms on consumers in captive markets.
See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 67, at 632.; RADIN, supra note 46. This argument is
unpersuasive because if a firm in fact has monopoly power it can extract rents by
simply raising prices. Indeed, in formal economic terms the ability to extract such rents
by raising prices is the definition of a monopoly.
122 See Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 58, at 835.
123 See Kenneth Frederick Berg, The Israeli Standard Contracts Law 1964:
Judicial Controls of Standard Form Contracts, 28 INT’L COMP. L. Q. 560, 565–66 (1979)
(summarizing Israeli law on boilerplate agreements).
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CONCLUSION
Voluntary consent lies at the center of the normative
justification of contract in contemporary legal theory. This
essay suggests that granting consent so exalted a position is a
mistake. If we see contracts as a way of using legal obligations to
solve various problems in the marketplace, then the important
thing about contract law is not that it is voluntary but that it is
decentralized and creative. What it provides is not so much
personal freedom as social experimentation. In this vision,
consent has a decidedly secondary role. First, consent serves to
coordinate the decentralized process of obligation authoring.
Second, consent serves as one among many forms of feedback,
weeding out pernicious or foolish transactional forms. However,
it is far from the only feedback mechanism, and provided that
other mechanisms exist there is no reason not to enforce
boilerplate agreements, even when they garner merely ignorant
and formal consent. Likewise, however, if such feedback
mechanisms fail, then the theory suggests that we can simply
refuse to enforce contractual terms that can be confidently
identified as pernicious or foolish, without undue hand wringing
about paternalism and the sanctity of voluntary agreement.
In the end, voluntary agreement simply isn’t all that sacred.
